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Empirical indicators of farm support by governments and their effects on consumer 
prices, called Producer and Consumer Support Estimates (PSEs and CSEs), have been 
estimated in a consistent way since 1986 by the Secretariat of the OECD (2009) for its 
30 member countries. The indicators provide policy transparency, contribute to a 
better understanding of the various dimensions of agricultural support measures in 
high-income countries, and have been used extensively as inputs into economic 
models of agricultural markets. The OECD (2006) has also released PSEs for Brazil, 
China and South Africa, as well as for several East European countries; and it will 
soon add them for Chile.  
  A recent global World Bank study (Anderson 2009) complements and extends 
the OECD’s efforts by providing similar estimates for a longer time period (back to 
1955) and for individual member countries of the European Union. It also has 
comparable estimates for 45 other countries at different stages of economic 
development and includes a time series of rates of assistance to producers of non-
agricultural goods, to compare with agricultural distortion estimates.  
  The OECD and World Bank measures for each product are aggregated using 
the value of production and consumption as weights to obtain an annual average PSE 
and CSE for each country. That traditional aggregation method provides a reasonable 
indicator of the average price distortion across that country’s product set, but it is not 
necessarily a good indicator of the distortion to the volume of trade in farm products 
because that depends also on the responsiveness of domestic supply and demand to 
price changes (that is, price elasticities), and on whether there are any negative PSEs 
that are offsetting positive ones in the aggregating process. It is an even poorer 
indicator of the national welfare cost of that country’s farm price and trade policies, 
because for each product that cost is related to the square of the rate of price 
distortion and so the total cost depends on the extent of dispersion in product PSEs 
and CSEs.  3 
 
Certainly one can use the OECD or World Bank price distortions as inputs 
into national partial or general equilibrium models to estimate the trade- and welfare-
reducing effects of a country’s agricultural policies. However, such models are 
computationally intensive, and the results can be contentious if there is no consensus 
on what model specification and parameters such as elasticities to use. Even more 
problematic is that typically they are calibrated only for a particular past year and so 
are not able to provide a time series of estimated economic effects.  
  An alternative is to use the raw data in the OECD and World Bank studies to 
calculate indexes of the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of policies. Anderson and 
Neary (2005) specify a simple, elegant and theoretically meaningful methodology to 
provide such measures as a supplement to aggregate PSEs and CSEs.  
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how the Anderson-Neary 
methodology can be applied using no more information than that assembled already to 
generate price distortion estimates for OECD member countries. The method may 
have been ignored to date because it was traditionally thought that price elasticity 
estimates were necessary to estimate such indices. However, it has recently been 
shown by Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) that by assuming domestic price 
elasticities of supply are equal across commodities within a country, and likewise for 
price elasticities of demand, the index number formulae simplify to a share-weighted 
function using shares of production and consumption as weights. The resulting 
measures thereby can be generated as supplements to the current policy monitoring 
indicators generated by the OECD Secretariat without having to tackle the contentious 
questions associated with the size of price elasticities (such as whether they refer to 
the short or long run) and without having to continually update a sector or economy-
wide model.  
Drawing on the Anderson and Neary framework, we estimate two indexes 
which go by the precise descriptors of a trade reduction index (TRI) and a welfare 
reduction index (WRI). The TRI and WRI are each computed from sub-indices of the 
production and consumption sides of the market (the Producer and Consumer 
Distortion Indexes, PDI and CDI), which are derived from nominal rate of assistance 
(NRA) and consumer tax equivalent (CTE) estimates for individual products, 4 
 
respectively, from the World Bank’s database.
1 NRAs to producers and CTEs to 
consumers differ whenever there are domestic subsidies or taxes on production or 
consumption in addition to border measures. Thus the indexes capture in a single 
scalar number the aggregate trade- or welfare-reducing effects of all policies directly 
affecting consumer and producer prices of farm products from all measures in place. 
Non-product-specific distortions are not captured in the indices, which by 
construction aggregate only product-specific data. However, we attempt to gauge the 
importance of this limitation in the final section of the paper.  
  The present paper is aimed at encouraging not only the OECD to add these 
indexes to their current set of indicators calculated each year, but also developing 
country governments or policy think-tanks to generate them so as to be able to 
monitor each year the trade and welfare effects of their national policies. A new 
FAO/OECD project, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and getting 
under way in 2010, aims to estimate agricultural policy indicators for a large sample 
of poor African countries over the next few years. Since many of those countries do 
not have a sector or economy-wide model of their economy, the two indicators 
outlined in this paper could provide at least a partial equilibrium indication of the 
effect of national policies in reducing agricultural trade and national economic 
welfare. They could then be compared with those provided in the present paper for 
high-income countries.   
  The paper begins with a presentation of the methodology for computing 
partial-equilibrium trade and welfare reduction indexes. It then outlines the data in the 
World Bank’s database, which are used for computing the indices. Next, the index 
results are presented and discussed, following which is a section addressing several 




There is a growing literature that identifies ways to measure the trade- and welfare-
reducing effects of international trade policy in scalar index numbers. This literature 
serves a key purpose: it overcomes aggregation problems (across different 
                                                 
1 NRAs and CTEs are similar to PSEs and CSEs, except they are expressed as a percentage of the 
undistorted price whereas PSEs and CSEs are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price (and the 
CSE has the opposite sign to the CTE). 5 
 
intervention measures and across industries) by using a theoretically sound 
aggregation procedure to answer precise questions regarding the trade or welfare 
reductions imposed by each country’s agricultural or trade policies. The goal of the 
literature is to generate a single indicator that captures the overall trade or welfare 
effect of an individual country’s regime of price distortions in place at any time, and 
to trace its path over time and make cross-country comparisons.  
The pioneering work in the literature is by Anderson and Neary (summarized 
in their 2005 book). Feenstra (1995) simplified the methodology to a partial-
equilibrium framework. These two authors define a Trade Restrictiveness Index as the 
ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly across all tradable agricultural 
commodities in a country, would generate the same reduction in welfare as the actual 
cross-product structure of distortions. They also define a Mercantilist Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) as the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied 
uniformly across all tradable agricultural commodities in a country, would generate 
the same reduction in international trade as the actual cross-product structure of 
distortions. 
In recent years, several empirical papers have provided various series of 
partial-equilibrium estimates of scalar index numbers for individual countries. Irwin 
(2010) uses detailed tariff data to calculate the Trade Restrictiveness Index for the 
United States in 1859 and annually from 1867 to 1961. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 
(2009) estimate a series of indices for trade policies of 78 developing and developed 
countries for a single point in time (mid-2000s). Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) 
modify the Anderson/Neary TRI and MTRI methodology to make it more applicable 
to agricultural policies, and show how it can be greatly simplified if certain 
assumptions about elasticities are adopted. Croser and Anderson (2010) build on that 
to develop a methodology for computing scalar index measures for individual policy 
instruments, which can be compared across instruments to see the relative 
contributions of different policy instruments to overall reductions in trade and 
welfare. In addition to being useful to summarize policy in an individual country, the 
Anderson-Neary scalar index measures has been adapted to measure the trade- and 
welfare-reducing effects of policy in a regional or global commodity market (Croser, 
Lloyd and Anderson 2010). In this paper we utilize the methodology in those latter 
three studies to generate a series of indicators of the trade- and welfare-reducing 
effects of agricultural policies in OECD countries over the past half century.  6 
 
The remainder of the methodology section outlines the method for 
constructing three types of indexes: the Anderson-Neary type indexes for individual 
countries; instrument level indexes for individual countries to gauge the importance of 
different policy measures in the overall degree of agricultural policy distortions of 
OECD countries; and commodity market indexes for that group of countries.  
 
Country level trade and welfare reduction indexes 
To capture distortions imposed by each country’s border and domestic policies on its 
economic welfare and its trade volume, we adopt the methodology from Lloyd, 
Croser and Anderson (2010). These authors define a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) 
and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI), each of which can be estimated by considering 
separately the distortions to the producer and consumer sides of the economy (which 
can differ when there are domestic measures in place in addition to or instead of trade 
measures). As their names suggest, the two indexes respectively provide a single 
empirical indicator of the (partial equilibrium) welfare- or trade-reducing effects of 
distortions to consumer and producer prices of farm products from all agricultural and 
food policy measures in place.  
The Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) methodology requires data on the 
production and consumption sides of the economy separately. Since PSE and CSE 
information is available from the OECD on an annual basis, this methodology is well 
suited to focusing on the trade and welfare effects of agricultural and trade policy in 
OECD member countries. Indeed it provides something closer than the PSE or CSE to 
what a sector or economy-wide computable general equilibrium model can provide in 
the way of estimates of the trade and welfare (and other) effects of price distortions, 
while having the advantage of providing an annual time series. 
The derivation of the measures in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) for 
n import-competing sectors leads to the expressions in Box 1 for the TRI and WRI for 
the import-competing sector of a country. The import-competing TRI and WRI are 
constructed from appropriately weighted averages of the level of distortions of 
consumer and producer prices. The same weights are used to construct both indexes, 
but the TRI is a mean of order one measure, while the WRI is a mean of order two. 
Because the WRI is a mean of order two, it better reflects the welfare cost of diverse 
agricultural price-distorting policies than the PSE or CSE since it captures the 
disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation. The 7 
 
WRI is positive regardless of whether the government’s agricultural policy is favoring 
or hurting farmers.  
The TRI and WRI can be readily extended to accommodate distortions to 
exported and nontradable agricultural goods (Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 2010). 
Separate sub-indices for each sub-sector are computed, and aggregated using sector 
values of production and consumption at undistorted prices as weights. Distortions to 
exportable industries enter the TRI aggregations as negative values because a positive 
(negative) price distortion in an exporting industry has a trade expanding (reducing) 
effect, and thus should decrease (increase) the TRI. Distortions to nontradable 
industries are assumed to be zero in the TRI aggregation because a domestic price 
distortion in a nontradable sector is assumed to have neither a trade expanding nor 
trade reducing effect because of the presence of high trade costs.
2  
Elasticities of supply and demand are required to compute the TRI and WRI 
expressions in Box 1. However, if one is willing to assume that price elasticities of 
supply (demand) are equal across commodities within a sub-sector or sector of an 
economy, then the elasticities in the numerator and denominator of the index weights 
cancel. This powerful simplifying assumption gives an expression for the TRI or WRI 
which is simply an appropriately weighted aggregate of distortions on production and 
consumption sides of the market. It is found by aggregating the change in consumer 
(producer) prices across commodities and using as weights the sector share of each 
commodity’s domestic value of consumption (production) at undistorted prices. That 
is, with this elasticity assumption, these indexes are attainable with the same 
information used to estimate the PSE and CSE (or NRA and CTE, which are similar 
except expressed as a proportion of the border price rather than the distorted domestic 
price). Yet they provide a better indication of the trade- or welfare-distorting effects 
of those producer and consumer price measures.   
A second assumption is made in the empirical part of the paper when 
aggregating across all OECD countries. It is to assume that the marginal responses of 
a country’s supply and demand to a price change are the same in aggregate for the 
sector. More precisely, we assume (see Box 1) that a=b=0.5, where the weight a (or 
b) is proportional to the ratio of the marginal response of domestic demand (or 
                                                 
2 This is consistent with the partial equilibrium nature of the indexes being generated here. In a general 
equilibrium model there could be indirect trade effects via the impact of distortions to nontradables on 
factor markets. 8 
 
supply) to a price change relative to the marginal response of imports to a price 
change.  
 
Other trade and welfare reduction indexes 
The country level TRI and WRI measures reported below aggregate the trade- and 
welfare-reducing effects of a wide range of policy measures. The variables si and ri in 
Box 1, as domestic-to-border price ratios, can theoretically encompass distortions 
provided by all trade tax/subsidy measures and quantitative restrictions on trade, plus 
domestic price support measures (positive or negative), plus direct interventions on 
inputs; and, where multiple exchange rates operate (as in numerous developing 
countries in the past), the measures can encompass an estimate of the import or export 
tax equivalents of those distortions.   
  While it is desirable to have a country level indicator that encompasses all of 
these distortions, agricultural policy analysts are sometimes interested in the relative 
contribution of different policy instruments to reductions in trade or welfare. To 
provide this insight, it is possible to use the Anderson-Neary framework to construct 
indicators of policy distortions at the instrument level and compare indices across 
instruments.
3 Croser and Anderson (2010) define an Instrument Welfare Reduction 
Index (IWRI) and an Instrument Trade Reduction Index (ITRI), which can be 
estimated by considering the distortion from a single policy instrument to the 
producer and consumer sides of the economy. They develop their methodology for 
four types of border distortions (import taxes and subsidies, and export taxes and 
subsidies) and for a series of domestic distortions in the form of production, 
consumption and input taxes and subsidies.  
One of the limitations of the ITRI and IWRI in the context of OECD countries 
is that, by construction, non-product-specific measures are not included in the 
estimates because such supports are not reported at the product level. However, non-
product-specific measures are clearly important for the overall story of agricultural 
policy in some OECD countries (reported below), as a result of a move in recent 
                                                 
3 This issue is not one that has been explored in the existing literature because most of the Anderson-
Neary type indexes are estimated for single policy instruments. Irwin (2010), for example, uses only 
import tariffs. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) report two series of indices, one based on tariffs only 
and the other on tariffs plus non-tariff import barriers. While they may be the dominant instruments for 
non-farm products, the agricultural sectors of OECD countries have been subject also to numerous 
domestic and export subsidies; and, in developing countries, agricultural production and export taxes 
also have been used.  9 
 
decades to forms of support at least somewhat decoupled from production. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, below we estimate the trade- and welfare-reducing 
effects of individual policy instruments. We assume that border measures are applied 
first, and this may be supplemented by additional domestic distortions. This allocation 
assumption provides an upper-bound on welfare losses from border measures and a 
lower bound on welfare losses from domestic measures. An attempt is made in the 
empirical section below to gauge the potential importance of non-product-specific 
support measures which are excluded from the formal ITRI and IWRI measures.   
We also report commodity level TRI and WRI indexes below, which give the 
aggregate trade- and welfare-reducing effects of OECD member country policies to 
individual commodity markets. These indices are computed using a methodology 
similar to that in Box 1, but where distortions are summed across countries for an 
individual commodity, instead of across commodities for an individual country. 
Croser, Lloyd and Anderson (2009) provide a detailed exposition of the methodology 
as it applies to individual commodity markets globally. Below we provide them for 




This study makes use of data from the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural 
Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). For high-income countries that 
database drew on the OECD’s PSE and CSE series (OECD 2009) for the period since 
1986, but extended the time series back to 1955 for many countries. In the case of the 
European Union, whose membership expanded several times over the past half 
century, the World Bank study provides distortion estimates by country on the 
assumption that the estimated EU-wide PSE and CSE for each product applied in each 
member country (see Josling 2009). Differences across EU countries in the overall 
sector distortion indicators are thus due to differing commodity shares in sector 
production and consumption. 
We focus on a subset of OECD and other countries in the World Bank 
database (hereafter called the focus countries): 15 Western European countries, all of 10 
 
which are OECD member countries;
4 13 of Europe’s transition economies, five of 
which are OECD member countries;
5 and six other high-income OECD member 
countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the 
United States. The OECD member countries that are not included in the focus 
countries sample are Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg (for which NRA estimates are 
not available and Mexico (a recent and much poorer member).  
The database contains annual estimates of nominal rates of assistance 
(NRAs, positive or negative) and consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) for key farm 
products. The NRA and CTE estimates in the database are at the commodity level 
and cover a subset of 39 agricultural products in the OECD. These so-called 
covered products account for around three-quarters of total agricultural production 
over the period studied. The database identifies the extent to which each commodity 
in each country each year is import or export dependent or a nontradable (which 
may change over time). For the 34 focus countries, the database contains around 
16,000 consistent estimates of annual NRAs to the agricultural sector and the same 
number of CTEs between 1955 and 2007. Since not all countries have estimates for 
the 1950s, we report estimates below starting from 1960. 
  The range of policy measures incorporated in the NRA estimates in the 
database is wide. By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios, the estimates 
include assistance provided by all tariff and nontariff trade measures at each 
country’s border, plus any domestic price support measures (positive or negative), 
plus an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions on inputs. 
Where and when multiple exchange rates operated, estimates of the import and 
export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The range of measures 
included in the CTE estimates includes both domestic consumer taxes and subsidies 
and trade and exchange rate policies, all of which drive a wedge between the price 
that consumers pay for each commodity and the international price at the border.  
  Analytical narratives of agricultural policies for the last five decades in the 
34 OECD countries are provided in Anderson (2009). This book reports on the data 
in the Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database, and contains case studies for 
specific regional groupings. The book reports on measures such as unweighted and 
                                                 
4 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
5 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine (OECD member countries in bold). 11 
 
weighted mean NRAs, standard deviations of NRAs, weighted mean NRAs for 
exportable versus import-competing covered products, measures of the trade bias of 
the agricultural sectors’ covered plus non-covered tradable products, and relative 
rates of assistance. 
  Josling (2009) provides an analysis of agricultural and trade policy 
distortions in Western Europe over the past 50 years. The analysis covers 18 
countries, using data that has been disaggregated in some instances from regional 
aggregates. The aggregate NRA and CTE results from this study are reported at the 
country level in Tables 1 and 2. (Appendix Table 1 lists the changing membership 
of the regional EU and EFTA blocs.) It confirms that Western European agricultural 
policy is characterized by high levels of assistance throughout the postwar period, 
albeit with declines for some countries since the mid-1980s. The latter is largely 
due to some re-instrumentation of agricultural policy away from import protection 
for specific commodities toward direct payments that are supported for socially 
responsible farming.   
  Anderson and Swinnen (2009) summarize agricultural policy in 18 of 
Europe’s transition economies, drawing on their more-detailed book (Anderson and 
Swinnen 2008). Despite the heterogeneity of reform experiences, they note some 
overall patterns. In the early 1990s, when reliable data for these regions are first 
available, support to agriculture is at reasonably low levels. This is because many 
trade and price distortions were removed throughout the region at the start of the 
reform period in the early 1990s. Since that time, changes in agricultural policy 
have tended to be characterized overall by stop-go phases, and sometimes reversals 
of previous reforms. In 2000–07, NRAs were on average higher than they were in 
the decade of the 1990s.  
  Honma and Hayami (2009) provide a study of agricultural policy in 
Northeast Asia over the past 50 years, illustrating the dramatic growth that can 
occur in distortions to agricultural incentives as real incomes grow. Distortions in 
these two countries are currently at high levels, driven by border protection for 
import-competing food products.  
  North America’s and Oceania’s lower levels of agricultural policy distortion 
contrast with those of Europe and Northeast Asia. In the US and Canada, real 
spending on agricultural support has not diminished greatly over time (Gardner 
2009). By contrast, in Australia and New Zealand, there was a rapid dismantling of 12 
 
agricultural policy support from the 1980s, which has resulted in Oceania having 
the lowest levels of distortion among OECD countries (Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd 
and MacLaren 2009).  
The country level aggregate measures in Tables 1 and 2 hide the degree of 
variation in commodity NRA and CTE estimates within countries. The case studies 
in Anderson (2009) report standard deviations around weighted mean NRAs for 
covered products in each country, showing that variation to be significant and not 
declining. One indication of the extent of variation between groups of products is 
provided by a comparison of the average NRA for import-competing and exportable 
product groups. The extent of this variation is shown in aggregate for EU countries 
and the 34 focus countries in Figure 1. There is a significant gap between the 
average NRA for import-competing and exportable products over the period shown, 
which reflects the extent of antitrade bias that has also persisted through time except 
for the most-recent period when international agricultural prices were rising.  
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of the measures reported in the case 
studies in Anderson (2009), sector averages of NRAs can be misleading as indicators 
of the aggregate extent of price distortion within the sector as it affects trade and 
welfare. They can also be misleading when compared across countries which have 
varying degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for farm products. Hence the need for 
supplementary TRI and WRI series for the additional insights these measures can 
provide.  
 
TRI and WRI Estimates 
 
Table 3 reports the TRI estimates for all covered farm products from 1960 to 2007 for 
all 34 focus countries and six regional groupings. For all of the regional aggregations 
except Oceania, agricultural policy overall was trade-reducing, with Northeast Asia 
and Western Europe experiencing the largest reductions in trade. The regional 
aggregations hide some of the country level variation in agricultural policy, however, 
and there were even some decades in which policies were trade expanding in some 
countries, for example Finland, Sweden and several transition economies in addition 
to Australia and New Zealand.  
  The TRI time series for the focus countries and the EU group are shown 
against the NRA time series in Figure 2. The most striking observation for these 13 
 
groupings is the close correlation between the TRI and NRA series. This result is 
driven by the dominance of the import-competing sector in each of these two 
aggregations. The close correlation between the two series need not always result, 
however. Oceania provides a counter example, where the TRI has the opposite sign to 
the NRA aggregates, indicating that trade policy overall in Oceania was trade 
expanding despite positive NRA aggregates, because there was positive assistance to 
Australia’s (and in some time periods New Zealand’s) dominant export sub-sector. 
Another example of where the correlation between the TRI and NRA breaks down is 
in the time period 1980–84 to 1985-89. The NRA is increasing for 34 focus countries, 
from around 40 to 60 percent, while the TRI falls in this period by a similar amount. 
Agricultural policies in the focus countries were on aggregate becoming less trade 
restrictive in this period (even though the NRA is increasing) because assistance was 
increasing for exportable products, in the form of export subsidies.  
  The WRI results reveal that over the period shown the aggregate NRA 
measure greatly understates the extent of welfare losses from agricultural and trade 
policies (Figure 2 and Table 4). Figure 2 shows that for EU countries the extent of 
understatement is greatest in the 1970s, and for the 34 focus countries the 
understatement is greatest in 1985–89. These large gaps coincide with world price-
spikes. The 1985–89 period is when a downward price spike resulted in import-
competing products being more distorted relative to export products, and conversely 
for the 1975–79 period.  
  The fall in the WRI for EU countries is dramatic following the peak in the 
early 1980s, and more dramatic than the fall in the EU’s aggregate NRA over the 
same time period (Figure 2). From the peak in 1980–84, there is a fall in both the 
weighted mean and the weighted variance of producer (consumer) distortions. Thus, 
the two elements of the WRI are falling, resulting in a steeper decline in the WRI than 
the NRA. This shows one of the benefits of generating a WRI: it provides a better 
sense of welfare improvements from policy reforms that reduce assistance to covered 
farm products. It should be noted, however, that from the mid-1980s, OECD members 
moved towards a re-instrumentation of agricultural policy, which is not fully reflected 
in the WRI and TRI estimates presented in Figure 2 (see next section).  
  The individual country WRI results are presented in Table 4. They are 
necessarily always above the TRI and the average of the NRA and CTE measures, 
and are always positive because they are means of order two. There is considerable 14 
 
variation in the extent of welfare reductions in policy over the period shown. In 
Western Europe, most countries have seen a decrease in their WRI in recent decades. 
For some countries this comes after a peak in the 1980s – such as in France, Ireland 
and Italy – whereas for other countries there has been more of a continual decline, as 
for example in the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland stand out among Western Europe countries for their 
exceptionally high WRIs, although these countries have experienced the steepest 
declines in recent decades. Canada’s WRI series is notable for its large increase above 
the NRA aggregate in the 1980s (when there was a large increase in the dispersion of 
its NRAs around the weighted mean).  
  The country-level WRI measures, which are derived using an overall measure 
of the distortion to producer and consumer prices in individual sectors of the 34 focus 
countries, masks the contribution of different policy instruments to welfare losses in 
each country. Figure 3 reports the decomposition of the overall country WRI by 
policy instrument for the 6 key regional groups. The decomposition is found by 
estimating WRI series for individual policy measures, and then apportioning the 
shares of these series to the overall WRI. In our 34 focus countries as a whole, border 
measures – which distort both producer and consumer prices – are by far the most 
significant of the distorting policy instruments. They account for upwards of 90 
percent of the welfare losses in all 6 sub-regions over time, with the proportion being 
above 97 percent in most instances.  
  The decomposition of border measures in Figure 3(a) shows that import tariffs 
are the dominant measure of distortion in terms of market price support in most 
regions. In the European Union and Northeast Asia, in particular, import taxes 
dominate border supports. In EFTA countries, import tariffs also dominate but these 
countries together also have significant export subsidies. Oceania has significant 
export subsidies in 1980–84, but they are reduced over time along with other 
reductions in policy distortions in those countries. Data are available only from 1992 
for Eastern Europe’s transition economies. In 2000–04, this sub-region has a range of 
distortionary policy instruments in use: import taxes dominate, but export taxes and 
subsidies are also present.  
  The final perspective from which to consider the trade- and welfare-reducing 
effects of policies in our 34 focus countries is at the commodity market level, for 
individual commodities. Figure 4(a) shows that rice is the most distorted commodity 15 
 
market across the 34 focus countries. This is followed by a group of vegetable 
products, which are heavily protected in Japan and Korea. The sugar, oilseed, milk, 
beef and cotton markets are the next most heavily distorted markets. The results for 
just the EU market indicate that sugar and livestock products are most heavily 
distorted in that region.   
  
Caveats and Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Some important caveats need to be mentioned, because the paper’s two main indexes 
have been calculated with the help of a number of simplifying assumptions. One key 
assumption is that each country’s own-price elasticity of supply (and also of demand) 
for a particular product is the same as that for every other product, and that cross-price 
elasticities are zero. It is not uncommon for modelers of the global market for 
particular farm products to adopt these assumptions, for want of reliable or agreed 
econometric estimates of those elasticities for each country (an early global example 
being Valdés and Zietz 1980). Anderson and Neary (2005, p. 293) observe that price 
elasticities are ‘not very influential’ in affecting trade restrictiveness indices because 
elasticities appear in both the numerator and denominator of the indices (see Box 1). 
In the present case, too, this assumption is expected to have only a small effect on the 
results. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) show that Anderson-Neary type indices can 
be decomposed into three elements: the weighted mean of distortions, the weighted 
variance of distortions, and the covariance between each distortion and its relevant 
elasticity scaled by the weighted average relevant elasticity. In empirical work, Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) note that the contribution of the covariance term to their 
estimated trade restrictiveness indexes is very small in practice. Irwin (2010) in his 
study for the United States similarly shows that the covariance is a very small factor 
relative to the average tariff and variance of the tariff.  
  Notwithstanding those expectations, to gauge the potential importance of not 
allowing differential price responses, we re-compute our two country-level indexes 
using country- and commodity-specific own-price elasticity of supply and demand 
estimates available for 27 key farm products from widely cited sources (Roningen 
2001; Tyers and Anderson 1992). A comparison in Table 5 of those results with the 
earlier estimates made with the simplifying elasticity assumption reveals some 
differences in the overall indications of distortions. The biggest divergences are for 16 
 
Korea and Japan, where the average WRI across countries using the elasticity data is 
between 6 and 46 percentage points lower than estimates without elasticity data. It 
should be noted, however, that this is off a high base of WRI averages of over 100 
percent in many instances. The Western European countries also have a fairly 
significant change in their TRI and WRI estimates. The elasticity values for this 
region reveal that livestock products tend to have a higher (absolute) elasticity of 
supply and demand, while grains and tropical crops have elasticities lower than the 
average.
6 As such, including elasticity estimates results in livestock products in the 
EU having a higher weighting than grains and sugar. There is little divergence in the 
results with and without the simplifying elasticity assumption for North America and 
Oceania, which have relatively low TRI and WRI estimates. Despite the differences 
reported in Table 5, it is clear that in all cases, the index trends over time are much the 
same under either set of elasticity assumptions, and they give a better indication of the 
trade reduction and welfare losses from agricultural policies than standard weighted 
aggregates of NRAs and CTEs.  
  Our other assumption — that the aggregate marginal response of domestic 
demand to a price change is the same as the aggregate marginal response of domestic 
supply— might also have an impact on the results. We re-compute our two indexes 
assuming that demand was instead twice, or half, as responsive as supply. Despite that 
wide range, the estimates were almost unchanged at the aggregate level across the six 
regional groups. This benign result is due to the empirical fact that the producer and 
consumer distortions are similar, reflecting the dominance of border measures in the 
policy instrument mix.     
A third caveat on the results for the TRI and WRI by policy instrument is the 
exclusion of non-product-specific (NPS) distortions in the estimates. In the Anderson 
and Valenzuela (2008) database, NPS assistance can be a significant component of 
overall agricultural sector distortions in some OECD countries. NPS is reported in 
three forms in the database: general NPS assistance, input subsidies that are not 
                                                 
6 Thus the size and ranking of the commodity indexes for the OECD country group, summarized in 
Figure 4, also would be affected somewhat by using differential elasticity estimates. Croser, Lloyd and 
Anderson (2010) examine this at the global level for eight major agricultural products and find that, if 
the elasticities found in Tyers and Anderson (1992) are used, there is little difference in the overall 
indications of distortions: the index averages using the elasticity estimates are 5 percentage points 
lower than the estimates using the simpler elasticity assumptions for one decade, but are between just 0 
and 3 points lower for the other seven decade averages shown. Not surprisingly the differences are 
largest for the product with the most diverse NRAs, namely rice. In all cases, the global commodity 
index trends over time are much the same under either set of elasticity assumptions.  17 
 
attributable at the product level, and decoupled payments. Recall that the ITRI (or 
IWRI) is defined as the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly across 
all tradable agricultural commodities in a country, would generate the same reduction 
in trade (or same economic welfare loss) as the actual cross-product structure of 
NRAs and CTEs for that country. A simple assumption to incorporate NPS measures 
is that all of the NPS distortions is enjoyed by producers and that they have no impact 
on consumer price distortions. This assumption allows us to provide, in Figure 3(b), 
an upper bound on their potential effect on the Producer Distortion Index (PDI) 
component of the ITRI or IWRI.
7 Figure 3(b) shows the results of adding in this way 
all NPS assistance to the Producer Distortion Index. On the one hand, decoupled 
support and general NPS support – if equivalent to an increase in product prices for 
farmers – would make up almost one-third of distortions in EFTA and EU countries in 
2000–04, and only slightly less in North America. On the other hand, if those forms of 
support were truly decoupled and had no impact on farmers’ incentives, the PDI 
would be unaffected and hence the WRI would be as in Table 4. The potential 
importance of NPS for the WRI is thus somewhere in that range. The WRI and TRI 
series need to be interpreted in the light of the uncertainty associated with their 





This paper presents a case study of the application of new theory-based policy 
indicators to monitor the changing extent of policy interventions that reduce 
international trade and national economic welfare in OECD countries. It reports 
estimates of the indicators for each OECD country over the past half century as a way 
of illustrating the prospective use of this methodology as a supplement to the annually 
released PSE/CSE indicators of the OECD. The paper also shows that the 
methodology can be used to gain better insight into the trade and welfare reductions in 
individual commodity markets across OECD countries, and those reductions by 
individual policy instruments.  
                                                 
7 For example, if the IWRI of all border measures is 30 percent, and the country also gives farmers 
decoupled payment support of 20 percent,  it is incorporated by assuming an overall country WRI of 50 
percent.  18 
 
In the past, trade and welfare reduction indicators have not been reported as 
part of the OECD regular monitoring activities. This may have been because it was 
thought that economic models and elasticity data would need to be agreed upon, 
which would raise technical and political problems. The measures we estimate in this 
paper are such that one can avoid the need to select a pair of price elasticity estimates 
for each product of each country. As such they could provide an attractive and 
politically uncontroversial supplement to the current policy monitoring indicators 
generated by the OECD, and by other multilateral institutions such as the FAO, 
UNCTAD, World Bank and the WTO.  
The importance of TRIs and WRIs will also be relevant for a new FAO/OECD 
project, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and getting under way in 
2010, which aims to estimate agricultural policy indicators for a sample of African 
countries over the next few years. In African countries, different policy instruments 
operate such that the TRI could have a different sign in some years to the NRA 
aggregate (because of, for example, export taxes). Furthermore, if there is no 
economy-wide model for some of the African countries in the FAO/OECD project 
sample, the TRI and WRI can provide at least partial equilibrium indicators of the 
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Box 1: TRI and WRI expressions 
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P
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Variable definitions:  
T — Trade Reduction Index; W — Welfare Reduction Index; R — weighted-average consumer price 
distortions; S — weighted-average producer price distortions; R— Consumer Distortion Index (CDI); 
S— Producer Distortion Index (PDI); si — the rate of distortion of the producer price in proportional 
terms; ri  — rate of distortion of the consumer price in proportional terms; ui — weight for each 
commodity in R and R’, which is proportional to the marginal response of domestic consumption to 
changes in international free-trade prices and can be written as a function of prices, demand quantities 
and domestic price elasticity (at the protected trade situation) of demand ( i  ); vi — weight for each 
commodity in S and S’, which is proportional to the marginal response of domestic production to 
changes in international free-trade prices and can be written as a function of prices, supply quantities 
and domestic price elasticity (at the protected trade situation) of supply, ( i  ); pi
* — border price;  P
i p  
= pi
*(1 + si ) — distorted domestic price; 
C
i p   = pi
*(1 + ri ) — distorted domestic consumer price; 
()
C
ii i xx p  — quantity of good i demanded (as a function of own domestic price);  ()
P
ii i yy p   — quantity 
of good i supplied (as a function of own domestic price); a (b) — weight of consumption (production) 
in the WRI or TRI, which is proportional to the ratio of the marginal response of domestic demand 
(supply) to a price change relative to the marginal response of imports to a price change.  
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010). 22 
 
Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance, OECD countries, all covered products, 1960 to 
2007 (percent) 
    1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Western European Countries 
European  Union  72 58 79 49 26 
EFTA  62  56 111 178 144 
Austria  53 21 40 66 33 
Denmark  41 60 83 48 26 
Finland  117 90 97  105 32 
France  64 49 78 52 25 
Germany  110 72 88 56 30 
Iceland  —  — 277 219 137 
Ireland  60 70  131 81 54 
Italy  40 35 56 36 18 
Netherlands  107 95 98 53 34 
Norway  —  — 293 237 147 
Portugal  11 22 30 29 19 
Spain  16 -4 28 35 19 
Sweden  134 90 92 75 32 
Switzerland  —  — 296 258 143 
UK    64 56 93 62 33 
Europe's transition 
economies  — — —  9 18 
Bulgaria —  —  —  -16  2 
Czech  Republic  — — — 17 21 
Estonia  — — —  0 20 
Hungary  — — — 16 21 
Latvia  — — —  5 28 
Lithuania  — — —  2 27 
Poland  — — — 15 15 
Romania  — — — 23 45 
Russia  — — —  1 12 
Slovakia  — — — 23 21 
Slovenia  — — — 67 52 
Turkey  — — — 20 24 
Ukraine —  —  —  -13  -9 
North  America  6  6 15 10 10 
Canada  8 11 26 17 13 
US 6  6  14  9  10 
Japan  &  Korea  62  87 135 156 143 
Japan      73  94 133 148 132 
Korea  10  61 145 192 189 
Oceania  8 7 9 3 0 
Australia  10 7 6 4 0 
New Zealand  2  10  17  2  2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)23 
 
Table 2: Consumer tax equivalents, OECD Countries, all covered products, 1960 to 
2007 (percent) 
    1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Western European Countries 
European  Union  71 57 68 38 24 
EFTA  57  52  97 137 113 
Austria  82 23 42 64 28 
Denmark  41 68 74 43 24 
Finland  128  92 123 124  31 
France  64 52 69 39 24 
Germany  101 67 70 38 24 
Iceland  —  — 172 164  98 
Ireland  42 84  120 64 35 
Italy  43 36 52 32 20 
Netherlands  103 89 97 52 30 
Norway  —  —  57 115 101 
Portugal  14 23 29 29 20 
Spain  19 -2 20 27 18 
Sweden  120 92  107 77 35 
Switzerland  —  — 171 179 121 
UK    55 52 83 49 33 
Europe's transition 
economies  — — —  0 15 
Bulgaria —  —  —  -15  5 
Czech  Republic  — — — 21 22 
Estonia  — — — -1 15 
Hungary  — — — 16 19 
Latvia  — — — 15 32 
Lithuania  — — —  1 25 
Poland  — — —  3 22 
Romania  — — —  5 34 
Russia  — — —  -12 19 
Slovakia  — — — 14 17 
Slovenia  — — — 53 36 
Turkey  — — — 15 12 
Ukraine —  —  —  -12  -1 
North America  7  7  11  -1  -1 
Canada  9 13 29 19 16 
US 7  6  9  -4  -2 
Japan  &  Korea  55  74 117 125 107 
Japan      65  80 113 118  97 
Korea  10  52 131 161 147 
Oceania 12  11  10  6  2 
Australia  17  11 8 7 2 
New Zealand  3  10  15  3  2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)24 
 
Table 3: Trade reduction indexes, OECD countries, all covered products, 1960 to 
2007 (percent) 
    1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Western European Countries 
European  Union  73 53 71 40 24 
EFTA  40 27 24 27 57 
Austria  67 22  2 15 30 
Denmark  -35 29 72 44 24 
Finland  28  -8 -43 -51  31 
France  66 46 70 41 23 
Germany  105 65 77 45 26 
Iceland  — — 59 23 40 
Ireland  -8 51  123 72 44 
Italy  47 33 50 28 18 
Netherlands  104 91 97 52 32 
Norway  —  —  60 175 120 
Portugal  13 22 26 23 18 
Spain  20 -1 23 27 17 
Sweden  44 47  -11 -6 33 
Switzerland  — —  124 31 23 
UK    59 50 86 54 33 
Europe's transition 
economies  — — —  9 11 
Bulgaria  — — — 10  8 
Czech Republic  —  —  —  -7  7 
Estonia  — — — 11  4 
Hungary —  —  —  -9  -17 
Latvia  — — — 26 17 
Lithuania  — — — 22 -5 
Poland  — — — 10  -12 
Romania  — — — 16 37 
Russia  — — — -2 22 
Slovakia —  —  —  3  3 
Slovenia —  —  —  -13  -20 
Turkey  — — — 19 13 
Ukraine  — — — 14 12 
North  America  4 3 8 5 4 
Canada  7 10 22 17 13 
US  3 2 7 4 3 
Japan  &  Korea  58  81 126 140 118 
Japan      69  87 123 133 112 
Korea  10  56 138 177 144 
Oceania  -5 -4 -5 -3  0 
Australia -9  -4 -5 -5 -1 
New Zealand  2  -3  -6  2  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 25 
 
Table 4: Welfare reduction indexes, OECD Countries, all covered products, 1960 to 
2007 (percent) 
    1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Western European Countries 
European Union  114  110  119  62  42 
EFTA  125 111 145 181 148 
Austria  92 41 60 83 47 
Denmark 80  122  128  63  39 
Finland  133 118 134 133  47 
France 105  106  120  64  43 
Germany 144  121  126  66  43 
Iceland  —  — 274 238 167 
Ireland 86  142  174  84  59 
Italy  89 81 96 55 38 
Netherlands 148  149  148  70  46 
Norway  —  — 227 201 147 
Portugal  26 44 50 49 37 
Spain  44 33 59 51 35 
Sweden 172  174  150  92  50 
Switzerland  —  — 268 240 149 
UK   144  127  132  72  50 
Europe's transition 
economies  — — — 40 42 
Bulgaria  — — — 27 25 
Czech  Republic  — — — 33 35 
Estonia  — — — 27 28 
Hungary  — — — 34 41 
Latvia  — — — 50 52 
Lithuania  — — — 53 53 
Poland  — — — 28 34 
Romania  — — — 40 60 
Russia  — — — 39 34 
Slovakia  — — — 31 33 
Slovenia  — — — 69 57 
Turkey  — — — 53 53 
Ukraine  — — — 35 26 
North  America  16 14 35 23 23 
Canada  15 32 83 46 38 
US  17 12 30 20 22 
Japan  &  Korea  77 119 190 221 192 
Japan      84 130 198 225 190 
Korea  44  77 153 202 203 
Oceania  25 22 20 14  5 
Australia  31 24 17 14  3 
New  Zealand  12 17 27 13  9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Table 5: Comparison of WRI and TRI estimates with and without simplifying elasticity assumption, sub-set of covered products,
 a 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
 
Using elasticity data for subset of 
products for which data are available 
With simplifying elasticity assumption 
and for a sub-set of products
a 
Comparison (percentage point 
difference between (1)-(5) and (6)-(10) 































Trade Reduction Indexes  
              EU  68 51 65 34 22  75 55 74 40 24  7  3 10  6  2 
              EFTA  37 24 25 24 55  41 29 25 27 57  4  4  0  3  2 
       ECA  na  na  na  5  7  na  na  na  8  11  -  -  -  4  4 
              NA  1 1 3 3 2  4 3 8 5 4  2 2 5 2 2 
       Japan & Korea  50  61  99  124  103  58  81 137 163 128  8 20 38 39 25 
       Oceania  -2  -2  -4  -1  0  -5 -4 -6 -3  0  -3 -1 -2 -2  0 
Welfare Reduction Indexes 
       EU  103  102  109  57  40  116  113  123  62  42  13  11  14  6  2 
              EFTA  108 100 138 173 147  126 113 146 181 148  18  13  8  8  1 
       ECA  na  na  na  39  45  na  na  na  41  43  -  -  -  2  -1 
       NA  13  11  27  19  20  16 14 35 23 23  4 3 9 4 4 
              Japan  &  Korea  70 101 162 201 171  77 119 201 246 205  6  18  39  46  34 
       Oceania     20  19  16  10  4  24 23 20 14  5  5 4 4 4 1 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and elasticity estimates from Roningen (2001) and Tyers and 
Anderson (1992). 
a. The TRI and WRI estimates in these columns are for a sub-set of farm products for which we have elasticity data (so as to enable direct 
comparison of the results with and without the simplifying elasticity assumption).  
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 Figure 1: Nominal rate of assistance, OECD countries, 1960 to 2007 (percent) 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Figure 2: Nominal rate of assistance, trade and welfare reduction indexes, OECD 
countries, 1960 to 2007 (percent) 
 





























Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Figure 3: Decomposition of indices by policy instrument, 1980-84 and 2000-04  
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 30 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1: EU and EFTA members represented in the Agricultural 
Distortions database 
 
(a) European Union (EU) members represented
a  
 
Year Countries   
1956  France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,  
1973  plus UK, Ireland, Denmark 
1986  plus Portugal, Spain  




(a) European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members represented 
 
Year Countries   
1960  Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
1970  Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Finland, Iceland  
1973  Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Iceland  
1986  Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Iceland 
1995  Norway, Switzerland and Iceland 
 
a Several of Europe’s transition economies joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. These 
countries are not included in the EU aggregates provided in this paper, but instead are 
included as part of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) aggregation. Also not 
included at Cyprus and Malta, which joined the EU in 2004.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ aggregations. 33 
 
Appendix Table 2: OECD commodity market trade reduction indexes, 44 covered 
farm products, 1960 to 2004 (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Grains  22 24 13 21 25 64 63 38 35 
Barley  36 31  3  -14 -1 37 32 10  4 
Coarse grains  -4  -4  -4 -4 -4 -2  0  0  0 
Maize  3 6 3  10 4 7  12 7 7 
Oat  15  9 -8 -3  -10 -2 -2 13  9 
Other  crops    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other  grains  na na na na na na 10 18 12 
Rice  60  73  95 125 165 357 404 326 374 
Rye  na na na na na na  2  1 14 
Sorghum  0 0 0  -1  -15  -3 6 5 7 
Wheat  17 15 -3  0 12 31 28  5  7 
Oilseeds  0 0  -1 2 6  15  11 5 1 
Hazelnut  na na na 17 57 47 40 31  4 
Oilseed  na na na  310  343  468  286 41 47 
Rapeseed  -4 -2 -1 -1 -1 31 16  0  0 
Soybean  0 1  -1 2 5 6 5 2 0 
Sunflower  0  -5 -12 -16 -31  41  28  16  11 
Tropical  Crops 29 61  2 35 50 63 43 47 46 
Cotton  1 -44 -29  -6  -8  -4  2  6 -12 
Sugar  102  217 17 81  109  164 99  105  111 
Tobacco  45 48 68 45 63 11  -25  -37 11 
Livestock  39 41 37 47 58 52 37 37 34 
Beef  24 21 18 16 39 53 41 45 42 
Egg  -8 -4 -7 10  9 14 11 13  8 
Milk  88 92 87  143  148  133 76 73 56 
Pigmeat  27 37 29 26 34 11  7 15 15 
Poultry  22 20 28 26 26 25 29 25 26 
Sheepmeat  64 80  110  167 98 72 43 20 20 
Wool  0  0 -6 -4 -7 -2 -4  0  0 
Fruit 
&vegetables  11  5  7 18 13 10  8 12 11 
Apple  -6  8 28 44 43 21 19 14 18 
Banana  0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 
Cabbage  na na na na na 17 28 79 90 
Cucumber  na na na na na 57 17 30 43 
Fruit & 
vegetables 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0
Garlic  na na na na na  250  289  213  123 
Grape  7 10 -4  5  8 16 18 31 22 
Mandarin  na na na na na 21 45 47 32 34 
 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Olive  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Onion  na na na na na 55 81  144  284 
Orange  25 25 26 33 38 13  3  1  1 
Pear  na na na na na 35 24 64  157 
Peas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pepper  na na na na na  175  245  146  197 
Potato  24 19 16 48 27  9  8  4  0 
Spinach  na na na na na 89  138  237  134 
Strawberry  na na na na na 11 25 26 17 
Tomato  -4 20 21 21 19  8 -5  3  2 
Wine  10 -3 -3 -4 -9 -2  -10 -4 -2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 35 
 
Appendix Table 3: OECD commodity market welfare reduction indexes, 44 covered 
farm products, 1960 to 2004 (percent)  
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Grains  39 48 38 47 48  103 96 61 55 
Barley  52 49 35 41 32 98 88 45 33 
Coarse  grains  4 4 4 4 4 2 0 0 0 
Maize  16 21 16 23 23 29 26 15 17 
Oat  52 72 63  105 41 67 70 33 31 
Other  crops    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other  grains  na na na na na na 11 18 12 
Rice  75  92 118 149 192 429 481 391 447 
Rye  na na na na na na 35 26 25 
Sorghum  0 0 0 2  24  12 9  11  15 
Wheat  35 45 25 21 31 63 57 28 23 
Oilseeds  4  6  9 14 31 41 34 24 26 
Hazelnut  na na na 21 57 47 40 31 12 
Oilseed  na  na  na 354 378 472 352 113 103 
Rapeseed  17 7 4 3 2  62  44 4 2 
Soybean  4  6  9 14 31 32 29 28 31 
Sunflower  10  9 16 24 43 69 49 23 16 
Tropical  Crops  49  133 46 52 69 99 74 77 90 
Cotton  7 58 39 16 19 40 36 38 55 
Sugar  161 288  46 100 126 192 123 128 139 
Tobacco  46 48 97 52 63 22 36 45 15 
Livestock  78 80 72 86 92 94 75 64 61 
Beef  47 39 37 45 76  102 86 83 80 
Egg  46 46 31 19 20 40 37 38 27 
Milk  161 163 149 233 202 211 127 102  86 
Pigmeat  50 77 63 57 67 35 35 32 34 
Poultry  37 33 46 39 43 48 58 48 51 
Sheepmeat  103 144 180 216 140 116  76  39  30 
Wool  0 0 6 7  11 7  10 8 6 
Fruit 
&vegetables  28 20 17 30 26 20 21 19 22 
Apple  6 16 35 49 48 24 21 21 24 
Banana  0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 
Cabbage  na na na na na 21 34 93  116 
Cucumber  na na na na na 57 17 30 43 
Fruit & 
v e g e t a b l e s  0   0000000   0
Garlic  na  na  na  na  na 250 289 213 123 
Grape  59 29 19 11 13 42 51 64 81 
Mandarin  na na na na na 21 45 47 32 36 
 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Olive  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Onion  na na na na na 55 81  144  284 
Orange  25 25 26 33 38 13  3  1  1 
Pear  na na na na na 35 24 64  157 
Peas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pepper  na  na  na  na  na 175 245 146 197 
Potato  80 79 35 74 45 17 17 13 28 
Spinach  na na na na na 89  138  237  134 
Strawberry  na na na na na 11 25 26 17 
Tomato  16 25 28 26 23 19  8  9  6 
Wine  18 4 4 4  10  11  10 4 2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Appendix Table 4: Elasticities of supply, 27 key covered farm products, OECD member countries and transition economies 
   Australia  Austria  Bulgaria Canada Czech Rep Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Iceland  
Barley 0.93  0.60  0.80  0.99  0.80  0.70 0.80  0.60  0.70  0.70  0.80  - 
Beef 0.70  0.57  0.30  0.50 0.30  0.55  0.30  0.57  0.55 0.55 0.30 0.57 
Cotton  0.50 - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Egg 0.60  0.75  0.35  0.55  0.35  0.75  0.35 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.35  0.75 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Maize  0.80 0.65 0.30 0.48  0.30  -  -  - 0.60 0.60 0.30  - 
Milk 0.50  0.60  0.30  0.50  0.30  0.65 0.30  0.60  0.65  0.65  0.30  0.60 
Oat 0.93  0.60  0.80  -  0.80  0.70  0.80 0.60  0.70  0.70  0.80  - 
Oilseeds  0.60 - - -  -  -  0.30  - - - - - 
Pigmeat 0.80  0.80  0.45  1.50 0.45  0.90  0.45  0.80 0.90 0.90 0.45 0.80 
Potato 0.93  0.60  0.80  0.99  0.80  0.70 0.80  0.60  0.70  0.70  0.80  - 
Poultry 0.80  0.75  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.80 0.70  0.75  0.80  0.80  0.70  0.75 
Rapeseed 0.60  0.30  0.30  0.55  0.30 0.75  -  -  0.75  0.75  0.30  - 
Rice  0.60  - 0.30  -  -  -  -  - 0.35  - 0.30  - 
Rye  - - - -  -  -  0.80  - - - - - 
Sheepmeat 0.70  0.80  0.35  -  0.35 0.70 0.35  0.80  0.70  0.70  0.35  0.80 
Sorghum  0.93 - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Soybean  0.50  - 0.45 0.60  0.45  -  -  - 0.40 0.40 0.45  - 
Sugar 0.50  0.45  0.20  0.50  0.20  0.15 -  0.45  0.15  0.15  0.20  - 
Sunflower  0.60 0.30 0.30  -  0.30  -  -  - 0.75 0.75 0.30  - 
Tobacco  0.50 - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Wheat 0.90  0.80  0.25  0.60  0.25  0.50 0.25  0.80  0.50  0.50  0.25  - 
Wine  - 0.20 0.20  -  -  -  -  - 0.20 0.20 0.20  - 
Wool  0.70 - - -  -  -  -  - - - -  0.80 38 
 
   Ireland  Italy  Japan  Korea  Latvia  Lithuania  Netherlands 
New 
Zealand Norway  Poland Portugal  Romania 
Barley 0.70  0.70  0.62  0.37  0.80  0.80 0.70  0.80  0.60  0.80  0.70  0.80 
Beef 0.55  0.55  0.40  0.50 0.30  0.30  0.55  0.45  0.57 0.30 0.55 0.30 
Cotton  - - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Egg 0.75  0.75  0.80  0.80  0.35  0.35  0.75 0.80  0.75  0.35  0.75  0.35 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Maize  -  0.60 - -  -  0.30  0.60  0.90 -  0.30  0.60  0.30 
Milk 0.65  0.65  0.40  0.80  0.30  0.30 0.65  0.60  0.60  0.30  0.65  0.30 
Oat 0.70  0.70  -  -  0.80  0.80  0.70 0.80  0.60  0.80  0.70  0.80 
Oilseed  - - - -  0.30  0.30  -  - -  0.30 - - 
Pigmeat 0.90  0.90  0.88  0.70 0.45  0.45  0.90  0.80 0.80 0.45 0.90 0.45 
Potato  0.70  0.70 - -  0.80  0.80  0.70  - -  0.80  0.70  0.80 
Poultry 0.80  0.80  1.27  0.90  0.70  0.70 0.80  0.80  0.75  0.70  0.80  0.70 
Rapeseed 0.75  0.75 - -  -  -  0.75  - - - -  0.30 
Rice -  0.35  0.50  0.35  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.35  0.30 
Rye  - - - -  0.80  0.80  -  - - - - - 
Sheepmeat 0.70  0.70  -  -  0.35 0.35 0.70 0.90  0.80  0.35  0.70  0.35 
Sorghum  - - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Soybean  - 0.40 0.65 0.36  -  -  -  -  - 0.45  - 0.45 
Sugar 0.15  0.15  0.45  -  0.20  0.20 0.15  -  -  0.20  0.15  0.20 
Sunflower  -  0.75 - -  -  -  -  - -  0.30  0.75  0.30 
Tobacco  - - - -  -  -  -  - - - - - 
Wheat 0.50  0.50  0.52  0.45  0.25  0.25 0.50  0.80  0.80  0.25  0.50  0.25 
Wine  -  0.20 - -  -  -  -  - - -  0.20  0.20 
Wool  - - - -  -  -  -  0.90  0.80 - - - 39 
 
   Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  Turkey  UK  Ukraine  US 
Barley 0.24  0.80  0.80  0.70  0.60 0.60 0.80  0.70  0.80  0.99 
Beef 0.25  0.30  0.30  0.55 0.57  0.57  0.30 0.55  0.30  0.60 
Cotton  - - - -  -  -  0.15  - -  0.74 
Egg 0.25  0.35  0.35  0.75  0.75  0.75 0.35  0.75  0.35  0.55 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  -  0.20  - - - 
Maize 0.38  0.30  0.30  0.60  - 0.65 0.30  -  0.30  0.48 
Milk 0.20  0.30  0.30  0.65  0.60 0.60 0.30  0.65  0.30  0.50 
Oat 0.24  0.80  -  0.70  0.60  0.60  -  0.70  0.80  - 
Oilseed  - - - -  -  0.30  -  - - - 
Pigmeat 0.40  0.45  0.45  0.90  0.80 0.80  -  0.90  0.45  1.00 
Potato -  0.80  -  0.70  0.60 -  0.80  0.70  0.80  0.99 
Poultry 0.50  0.70  0.70  0.80  0.75 0.75 0.70  0.80  0.70  0.65 
Rapeseed  -  0.30 -  0.75  0.30  -  -  0.75 - - 
Rice  - - -  0.35  -  -  0.30  - -  0.40 
Rye  0.24  0.80 - -  -  -  -  -  0.80 - 
Sheepmeat -  0.35  0.35  0.70  0.80 0.80 0.35  0.70  -  0.80 
Sorghum  - - - -  -  -  -  - -  0.99 
Soybean  -  0.45 -  0.40  -  -  -  - -  0.60 
Sugar 0.16  0.20  0.20  0.15  0.45 0.45 0.20  0.15  0.20  0.50 
Sunflower 0.15  0.30  -  0.75  -  - 0.30  -  0.30 - 
Tobacco  - - - -  -  -  0.20  - - - 
Wheat 0.23  0.25  0.25  0.50  0.80 0.80 0.25  0.50  0.25  0.60 
Wine  -  0.20 -  0.20  -  -  -  - - - 
Wool  - - - -  -  -  -  - -  0.80 
 
Sources: Authors’ compilation from Roningen (2001) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, Appendix Tables A2 to A4).  40 
 
Appendix Table 5: Elasticities of demand (absolute value), 27 key covered farm products, OECD member countries and transition economies 
   Australia  Austria  Bulgaria Canada Czech Rep Denmark Estonia  Finland France Germany Hungary Iceland
Barley  0.64 0.77 0.68 1.07  0.68  0.91 0.68 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.68  - 
Beef  0.78 0.70 0.20 0.80  0.20  0.70 0.20 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.20 0.70 
Cotton  0.20 - - -  -  - - - - - - - 
Egg  0.25 0.35 0.10 0.30  0.10  0.20 0.10 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.35 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  - - - - - - - 
Maize  0.68 1.11 0.66 1.03  0.66  -  -  - 1.06 1.06 0.66  - 
Milk  0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15  0.14  0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 
Oat 0.64  0.77  0.68  -  0.68  0.91 0.68 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.68  - 
Oilseeds  0.38 - - -  -  -  0.72 - - - - - 
Pigmeat  1.02 0.60 0.50 0.86  0.50  0.80 0.50 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.60 
Potato  0.64 0.77 0.68 1.07  0.68  0.91 0.68 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.68  - 
Poultry  0.80 0.65 0.25 0.67  0.25  0.90 0.25 0.65 0.90 0.90 0.25 0.65 
Rapeseed  0.38 0.27 0.72 0.45  0.72  0.35  -  - 0.35 0.35 0.72  - 
Rice  0.45 -  0.15 -  -  - - -  0.50 -  0.15 - 
Rye  - - - -  -  -  0.68 - - - - - 
Sheepmeat 1.20  0.47  0.28  -  0.28  0.90 0.28 0.47 0.90 0.90 0.28 0.47 
Sorghum  0.64 - - -  -  - - - - - - - 
Soybean  0.25  - 0.13 0.26  0.13  -  -  - 0.16 0.16 0.13  - 
Sugar  0.25 0.29 0.30 0.24  0.30  0.50  - 0.29 0.50 0.50 0.30  - 
Sunflower  0.38 0.27 0.72  -  0.72  -  -  - 0.35 0.35 0.72  - 
Tobacco  0.50 - - -  -  - - - - - - - 
Wheat  0.39 0.53 0.37 0.57  0.37  0.57 0.37 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.37  - 
Wine  - 0.50 0.50  -  -  -  -  - 0.50 0.50 0.50  - 
Wool  1.20 - - -  -  - - - - - -  0.47 41 
 
 
   Ireland  Italy  Japan  Korea  Latvia  Lithuania  Netherlands 
New 
Zealand Norway  Poland Portugal  Romania 
Barley  0.91 0.91 1.32 0.74  0.68  0.68  0.91 0.64 0.77 0.68 0.91 0.68 
Beef  0.70 0.70 1.00 0.80  0.20 0.20 0.70  0.60  0.70 0.20 0.70 0.20 
Cotton  - - - -  -  -  - - - - - - 
Egg  0.20 0.20 0.30 0.20  0.10  0.10  0.20 0.60 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.10 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  -  - - - - - - 
Maize  -  1.06  -  -  - 0.66 1.06  0.89  -  0.66  1.06  0.66 
Milk  0.16 0.16 0.19 0.80  0.14  0.14  0.16 0.01 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 
Oat  0.91  0.91  -  -  0.68 0.68 0.91 0.64 0.77 0.68 0.91 0.68 
Oilseed  - - - -  0.72  0.72  - - -  0.72 - - 
Pigmeat  0.80 0.80 0.95 0.90  0.50  0.50  0.80 0.55 0.60 0.50 0.80 0.50 
Potato  0.91  0.91  -  -  0.68 0.68 0.91  -  -  0.68  0.91  0.68 
Poultry  0.90 0.90 1.10 0.70  0.25  0.25  0.90 0.60 0.65 0.25 0.90 0.25 
Rapeseed 0.35  0.35 - -  -  -  0.35 - - - -  0.72 
Rice  - 0.50 0.25 0.20  -  -  -  -  -  - 0.50 0.15 
Rye  - - - -  0.68  0.68  - - - - - - 
Sheepmeat 0.90  0.90  -  -  0.28  0.28  0.90 0.60 0.47 0.28 0.90 0.28 
Sorghum  - - - -  -  -  - - - - - - 
Soybean  - 0.16 0.14 0.12  -  -  -  -  - 0.13  - 0.13 
Sugar 0.50  0.50  0.54  -  0.30  0.30  0.50  -  - 0.30 0.50 0.30 
Sunflower -  0.35  -  -  - - -  -  -  0.72  0.35  0.72 
Tobacco  - - - -  -  -  - - - - - - 
Wheat  0.57 0.57 0.39 0.61  0.37  0.37  0.57 0.31 0.53 0.37 0.57 0.37 
Wine  -  0.50 - -  -  -  - - - -  0.50  0.50 
Wool  - - - -  -  -  -  0.60  0.47 - - - 42 
 
 
    Russia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK Ukraine US
Barley  0.38 0.68 0.68 0.91  0.77 0.77  0.68  0.91  0.68  1.38 
Beef  0.19 0.20 0.20 0.70  0.70 0.70  0.20  0.70  0.20  0.70 
Cotton  - - - -  -  -  0.15 - -  0.20 
Egg  0.15 0.10 0.10 0.20  0.35  0.35 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.35 
Hazelnut  - - - -  -  -  0.50 - - - 
Maize  0.54 0.66 0.66 1.06  -  1.11 0.66  - 0.66 0.80 
Milk  0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16  0.15 0.15  0.14  0.16  0.14  0.16 
Oat  0.38 0.68  - 0.91  0.77  0.77  - 0.91 0.68  - 
Oilseed  - - - -  -  0.27 - - - - 
Pigmeat  0.18 0.50 0.50 0.80  0.60 0.60  -  0.80  0.50  0.86 
Potato  - 0.68  - 0.91  0.77  - 0.68 0.91 0.68 1.38 
Poultry  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.90  0.65 0.65  0.25  0.90  0.25  0.56 
Rapeseed  - 0.72  - 0.35  0.27  -  - 0.35  -  - 
Rice  - - -  0.50  -  -  0.15 - -  0.25 
Rye  0.38  0.68 - -  -  - - -  0.68 - 
Sheepmeat  - 0.28 0.28 0.90  0.47  0.47 0.28 0.90  - 0.70 
Sorghum  - - - -  -  - - - -  1.38 
Soybean  - 0.13  - 0.16  -  -  -  -  - 0.30 
Sugar  0.15 0.30 0.30 0.50  0.29 0.29  0.30  0.50  0.30  0.24 
Sunflower  0.37 0.72  - 0.35  -  - 0.72  - 0.72  - 
Tobacco  - - - -  -  -  0.50 - - - 
Wheat  0.29 0.37 0.37 0.57  0.53 0.53  0.37  0.57  0.37  0.49 
Wine  - 0.50  - 0.50  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Wool  - - - -  -  - - - -  0.70 
Sources: Authors’ compilation from Roningen (2001) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, Appendix Tables A2 to A4).  